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Thomas v. City of North Las Vegas, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 9 (Feb. 9, 2006)1 
 
ARBITRATION – REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARD 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from district court order vacating arbitration awards and denying attorney fees.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ request for attorney fees, 
reversed the district court’s decision vacating the arbitration awards, and imposed sanctions upon 
defendants’ attorney for improper appellate conduct.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 This case arises from the discharge of Michael Thomas and John Armstrong from their 
employment as police officers with the North Las Vegas Police Department (NLVPD).  Thomas 
was terminated in August of 1999 for associating with known offenders, unprofessional conduct, 
and noncompliance with orders, public statements, and media releases.  Armstrong was 
terminated in May of 1999 for alleged sexual harassment towards coworkers.   
 The exclusive bargaining representative for the officers of the NLVPD was their union, 
the North Las Vegas Police Officers Association (NLVPOA).  The City and the NLVPOA had 
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which governed the employment of the 
officers.  Under the CBA, the officers could not be terminated other than for just cause.  
 The CBA included a grievance and arbitration procedure, which was the exclusive 
remedy for any dispute under the CBA.  The procedure contended that the NLVPOA’s grievance 
committee would review all employee grievances, and if the committee determined a grievance 
existed, the grievance would be submitted to the city.  The CBA at the time of this action 
provided that the NLVPOA had the right to submit matters where settlement could not be 
reached between the city manager and the NLVPOA to arbitration.   
 Following their terminations, Thomas and Armstrong retained counsel and requested 
NLVPOA representation.  The NLVPOA denied Thomas’s and Armstrong’s requests for 
representation because the NLVPOA’s Constitution prohibited it from representing them.   
 Thomas and Armstrong then appealed to the North Las Vegas Civil Service Board, and 
were denied.  They then filed petitions with the district court to compel arbitration.  The petitions 
were consolidated and the district court granted the petitions.  The NLVPOA then issued a 
position statement stating that it believed that its initial position denying the representation had 
been erroneous, and that it now believed that Thomas and Armstrong were entitled to arbitration.   
 Thomas and Armstrong then moved for attorney fees.  The district court denied their 
motion and they appealed to this court. 
 The CBA mandated that arbitrations be conducted by the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Services (FMCS).  The parties agreed on Matthew Goldberg as arbitrator for 
Armstrong’s arbitration, and he was  also assigned to Thomas’s arbitration when agreement on 
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an arbitrator could not be reached.  Goldberg found the city had just cause to terminate Thomas 
and Armstrong in January of 2003 and June of 2003, respectively.  In March of 2003, Thomas 
called the FMCS to complain about Goldberg’s service as arbitrator, and the FMCS alerted 
Thomas to the fact that Goldberg served as a neutral arbitrator on a permanent panel of 
arbitrators for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and its unions, the Police 
Protective Association, and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Manager’s and Supervisor’s 
Association.  The resume which Goldberg had provided to Thomas and Armstrong had not 
disclosed that panel membership.2   
 Thomas and Armstrong then moved to vacate the arbitration awards.  The district court 
granted the motions to vacate the arbitration awards.  The city appealed.    
 
Discussion 
 
Attorney Fees  
 
 The decision denying attorney fees was reviewed de novo because the matter implicated 
questions of law.  The court held that attorney fees are not awarded absent an exception.  The 
Defendants first argued that they were entitled to attorney fees under the substantial benefit 
doctrine, which states that attorney fees will be awarded “when a successful party confers a 
substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court’s jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs 
proportionately among them.”3  The exception is normally applied in cases involving 
shareholders and unions.   
 There are three requirements which must be met in order to recover attorney fees under 
the substantial benefit doctrine: 1) the class of beneficiaries is small and identifiable, 2) the 
benefit can be traced with some accuracy, and 3) the costs can be shifted with some exactitude to 
those benefiting.  The court held that although Thomas and Armstrong met the first two factors, 
they failed the third factor, thereby making the substantial benefit doctrine inapplicable.  Thomas 
and Armstrong failed the third factor because the City’s citizens did not benefit from the order 
compelling arbitration, and therefore the City as a whole cannot be ordered to bear the cost of the 
litigation.  The court strengthened this decision by citing that although his issue was a matter of 
first impression in this court, other courts that have addressed the matter have held that the 
substantial benefit doctrine does not usually apply to a municipality when the taxpayers as a 
whole will not benefit from the litigation.   
 Next the Defendants argued that they should be entitled to recover attorney fees under 
NRS 18.010(2)(a), which states that the court may award attorney fees when the party has not 
recovered more than $20,000.  However, the court held that this exception has always been 
interpreted to apply only when the party first obtains a money judgment.   
 Finally, the Defendants requested attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b), which allows 
the award of attorney fees when the opposing party’s defense was brought without reasonable 
ground or for the purpose of harassing the prevailing party.  However, the court held that the 
                                                 
2 Goldberg had three versions of his resume, and only the one provided to the National Mediation Board disclosed 
the panel memberships.   
3 Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 137 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 
(1973) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970))). 
Defendants were making bare accusations and did not support their statements by any citation to 
the record, and also misinterpreted the facts.   
 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s holding denying attorney fees.   
 
Sanctions for Appellate Misconduct 
 
 The court held that sanctions were appropriate for Defendants’ counsel, John Benedict, 
according to NRAP 28(a) and (e), which state that an appellant’s brief shall contain “the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefore, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon,” and that “every assertion 
in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a reference to the page of the 
transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.”  The court held that Benedict 
rarely cited to the 1407 page appendix in his the opening brief’s statement of facts and the 
opening and reply brief’s discussion sections.  Further, Benedict accused the City and NLVPO of 
conspiracy, fabrication of charges against the Defendants, retaliation, harassment, racial and 
ethnic slurs, physical assault, and attempted vehicular homicide, none of which were supported 
by facts in the record.  For these reasons the court fined Benedict $1000.   
 
Vacatur of the Arbitration Awards 
 
 The standard of review for district court orders vacating or confirming an arbitration 
award for evident partiality is de novo.  NRS 38.145 allows the court to vacate an arbitration 
award where there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as neutral.  In 
Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co.,4 the court set forth the standard for claims of evident 
partiality, stating that they fall into two categories, actual bias and nondisclosure of information.  
This case falls into the second category, nondisclosure, where the standard is that the arbitrator 
“not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”5  Other courts 
adopting this standard have interpreted it to mean that whether an arbitrator has shown evident 
partiality by the nondisclosure of a relationship is whether the nondisclosure gives rise to a 
“reasonable impression of partiality.”6  
Whether Goldberg’s nondisclosure resulted in a reasonable impression of partiality had to 
be determined under the FMCS guidelines, since the parties agreed to arbitrate under those rules.  
Under the Code utilized by the FMCS,7 section 2(B)(1), an arbitrator has a duty to disclose any 
“current or past managerial, representational, or consultative relationship with any company or 
union involved in a proceeding in which the arbitrator is being considered for appointment or has 
been tentatively designated to serve.  Disclosure must also be made of any pertinent pecuniary 
interest.”  The Defendants argue that Goldberg had a duty to disclose his membership on the 
panel because he had a continuing pecuniary relationship with Metro and the PPA/PMSA.   
 The court held that Goldberg did not have a duty to reveal his panel membership because 
he was not in a managerial, representational, or consultative position, which is a prerequisite 
under section 2(B)(1) before disclosure is mandatory.   
                                                 
4 393 U.S. 145 (1968).   
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6 Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).  
7 Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes. 
 Under section 2(B)(3), an arbitrator must also disclose “any close personal relationship or 
other circumstance…which might reasonably raise a question as to the arbitrator’s impartiality.”  
In Opinion No. 22, the National Academy of Arbitrators interpreted this section and held that 
“[p]revious or current service as a neutral arbitrator for a particular employer and/or union is not 
a relationship requiring disclosure under the Code.”  Therefore, the court held that Goldberg did 
not have a duty to disclose his Metro PPA/PMSA panel membership because this nondisclosure 
did not demonstrate evident partiality.   
 Consequently, the court found that the district court had erred in vacating the arbitration 
awards. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 The court held that Thomas and Armstrong were not entitled to attorney fees, and 
Goldberg did not have a duty to disclose his panel membership.  Therefore, the district court’s 
decision denying attorney fees was affirmed, its decision vacating the arbitration awards was 
reversed and remanded to district court to confirm the arbitration awards, and attorney John 
Benedict was sanctioned $1000 for improper appellate conduct.   
